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Despite the recent advances in information and communication technology 
that have increased our ability to store and circulate information, the task of 
ensuring that the right sorts of information gets to the right sorts of people 
remains. We argue that the many efforts underway to develop efficient means 
for sharing information across healthcare systems and organizations would 
benefit from a careful analysis of human action in healthcare organizations. 
This in turn requires that the management of information and knowledge 
within healthcare organizations be combined with models of resources and 
processes of patient care that are based on a general ontology of social 
interaction. The Health Level 7 (HL7) is one of several ANSI-accredited 
Standards Developing Organizations operating in the healthcare arena. HL7 
has advanced a widely used messaging standard that enables healthcare 
applications to exchange clinical and administrative data in digital form. HL7 
focuses on the interface requirements of the entire healthcare system and not 
exclusively on the requirements of one area of healthcare such as pharmacy, 
medical devices, imaging or insurance transactions. This has inspired the 
development of a powerful abstract model of patient care called the Reference 
Information Model (RIM). The present paper begins with an overview of the 
core classes of the HL7 (Version 3) RIM and a brief discussion of its “act-
centered” view of healthcare. Central to this account is what is called the life 
cycle of events. A clinical action may progress from defined, through planned 
and ordered, to executed. These modalities of an action are represented as the 
mood of the act. We then outline the basis of an ontology of organizations, 
starting from the theory of speech Acts, and apply this ontology to the HL7 
RIM. Special attention is given to the sorts of preconditions that must be 
satisfied for the successful performance of a speech act and to the sorts of 
entities to which speech acts give rise (e.g. obligations, claims, commitments, 
etc.). Finally we draw conclusions for the efficient communication and 
management of medical information and knowledge within and between 
healthcare organizations, paying special attention to the role that medical 
documents play in such organizations. 1 Introduction 
An organization can be seen as a collection of agents who interact, 
communicate, cooperate, coordinate, negotiate, and so on, with one another in 
order to achieve a common goal. Healthcare likewise can be characterized as a 
series of actions that are performed to benefit patients. The authors of the HL7 
RIM defend an explicitly “act-centered” view of healthcare based on the 
assumption that any profession or business, including healthcare, primarily 
consists of a series of attributable, intentional actions on the part of 
responsible actors. The abundance of such acts in the healthcare domain 
attests to this. They include clinical observations, assessments of health 
conditions such as diagnoses, treatment services (such as medication, surgery, 
physical and psychological therapy), assisting, monitoring or attending, 
training and education services to patients and their next of kin, notary 
services (such as the preparation of an advanced directive or a living will), 
editing and maintaining documents, and many others. But there are many 
features of a healthcare organization that go beyond the category of action. 
These include the participants of the actions themselves, the roles that these 
participants play in an action, their authority to perform a given action, and 
the sorts of entities that these actions give rise to such as obligations and 
claims, as well as physical events such as births and deaths. All of these must 
be taken into consideration in a complete ontology of the healthcare domain.  
We argue that efforts such as the HL7 to develop efficient means for 
sharing information across healthcare systems and organizations would 
benefit from a careful analysis of human action in this larger ontological 
context. Certainly we require a systematic understanding of the sorts of 
actions that are typical of healthcare organizations, but we also require an 
account of the contexts and the concomitant products of such actions and the 
management of information and knowledge within healthcare organizations 
should be combined with models of resources and processes of patient care 
that are based on ontology and all that is involved. Furthermore, we argue that 
models of healthcare that are more in line with the way people actually act in 
healthcare organizations will go a long way to ensuring that the right sorts of 
information get to the right sorts of people. Mario Stefanelli [1] notes that 
there is a need to investigate the dominant role of cognitive-organizational 
factors in adapting systems to users working practices. An important step to 
achieving this task is the development of a sound ontology of healthcare 
organizations. 
2 An Overview of the HL7 RIM 
2.1 The Six “Backbone Classes” of the RIM The RIM is intended to serve as a unified framework for the sharing of 
information and the usage of data across different healthcare domains. As 
such, the authors of the RIM have organized the relevant healthcare 
information into what they call the six “backbone classes” of the RIM: Act, 
Entity, Role, Participation, Act-Relationship, Role-Link [2]. The first three 
classes (Act, Entity, and Role) are “high-level” classes, which means that they 
have specialized subclasses. The last three classes (Participation, Act-
Relationship, and Role-Link) represent relations between members of the first 
three classes.  
 
Act Class  Intentional actions documented by a healthcare 
professional in either a clinical or administrative 
context that has happened, can happen, is 
happening, is intended to happen, or is 
requested/demanded to happen.  
Entity Class  Physical things or groups of physical things that 
can participate in an action as perpetrator, target or 
beneficiary (e.g., living subjects (including human 
beings), organizations, material, and places and 
their specializations). It does not indicate the roles 
played, or the acts that these entities participate in.  
Role  The competency of an entity, which can participate 
in an Act in a particular Role.  
Participation  An association between an Entity in a Role and a 
specific Act.  
ActRelationship  Relates acts such as an order for an observation and 
the observation event as it occurs. Also relates an 
act to its component acts.  
RoleLink  A connection between two roles such as ‘patient’ 
and ‘provider’ that expresses a dependency 
between those roles. 
  
2.2 The Act-Centered View of Healthcare 
Of the six classes of the RIM, the Act class plays the central role, since all 
information and processes in the healthcare domain are represented primarily 
in terms of the acts that can be attributed to someone within the context of a 
healthcare organization. The Act class plays an even more expansive role, 
since, from the perspective of the RIM, documents or “collection of 
information” is considered as a collection of attributed, intentional acts and 
not as one might expect from the above an Entity. By an attributed act, they 
mean that every statement in the medical record is about what they have said 
about what they have heard, seen, thought and done.  Following Rector [3], the authors of the RIM view faithfulness to the 
clinical history and care of the patient as the fundamental criterion for the 
record:  
 
The first consequence of our view of faithfulness is that the information in 
the medical record itself is not about what was “true” of the patient but 
what was observed and believed by clinicians.  
 
Medical records, then, need not document what actually occurs in a given 
situation; they may document only what the physician thought was true on the 
basis of his or her observations. The RIM documentation employs in this 
connection a philosophical view according to which the truth of the real world 
is “constructed” through a combination (and arbitration) of attributed 
statements only, so that there is no class in the RIM whose objects represent 
“objective states of affairs” or “real processes” independent of attributed 
statements. It is for this reason that every act in the RIM must be an attributed 
act. No direct reference is made to natural events such as a patient’s heartbeat: 
a patient’s heartbeat may be recorded as observed, but there is no record of the 
event itself; but there is a record of the observation by, say, a physician.  
Unlike the approach adopted by Nolen, which remains limited to 
observation statements, the Act class embraces the full range of speech acts: 
 
The notion of speech-act includes that there is pragmatic meaning in 
language utterances, aside from just factual statements; and that these 
utterances interact with the real world to change the state of affairs, even 
directly cause physical activities to happen. For example, an order is a 
speech act that (provided it is issued adequately) will cause the ordered 
action to be physically performed [ 1 (3.1.1)]. 
 
The act of observing a resident attend to a patient is not linked to any other 
acts in the same way that, say, the act of ordering a blood test is linked to the 
act of performing the blood test. The authors of the RIM recognize the 
importance of paying special attention to the ways that speech acts such as 
orders and requests are a kind of doing that goes beyond the simple reporting 
of facts and they recognize also that these acts stand in systematic relations to 
other acts within the framework of a healthcare organization and that the more 
accurately a healthcare model captures these systematic relations between 
(speech) acts the more information will be made available to its users.  
2.3 The Act Life Cycle  
The life cycle of an act is divided-up into what are called moods. An activity 
is said to progress from defined, to planed and ordered, to executed. The 
definition mood of an act provides definitions of possible service actions and 
service action plans. An action may be represented as a single instance of the Act class, in which case the definition mood code specifies the major type of 
act (e.g. a clinical observation) and determines the sorts of participants 
involved (physician, patient), the required objects (e.g. specimen, facility, 
equipment) and so on. An action can also be decomposed into sub-acts, i.e., as 
a "collection" of (partially ordered) instances of act each of which is a finer 
granularity than the entire procedure, e.g. obtain consent, administer pre-op 
medication, administer anesthesia (throughout the surgical procedure), make 
the incision, etc. In turn, for any of the more finely granulated actions just 
mentioned, further granulation/decomposition may occur [(A 1.4)]. The Intent 
mood represents an intention or plan to perform a service action and specifies 
whom the people involved in the intended act, especially the author of the 
intended action or any individual assignments if the action involves a group, 
and the objects actually or supposedly involved in the act (e.g., specimen sent, 
equipment requirements, etc.). A promise is an example of an intention to 
perform a service that has the strength of a commitment. An order or a request 
is an intent directed from a placer of an order (request author) to a fulfiller of 
an order (service performed). The Event mood represents the execution of the 
promised deed, the requested action, and the ordered service. 
3 Speech Acts in Healthcare Organizations 
J. L. Austin [4] and John R. Searle [5] were the first to emphasize that what 
we can do with words goes well beyond uses of language of the statement-
making sort. We can make requests, ask questions, give orders, make 
promises, give thanks, offer apologies, and so on, all of which are kinds of 
actions and are such that their utterance brings about some result. The variety 
of speech acts within the context of a healthcare organization is immense. Our 
analysis of speech acts will begin with a discussion of one sort of speech act, 
namely the promise, and then broaden to a discussion of speech acts in 
general. 
Speech acts are social acts and as such they involve at least two people. In 
this sense, speech acts are opposed to solitary acts (e.g. the rehearsal of a 
difficult medical procedure in one’s head). Every promise requires a promiser 
and a promisee. We represent this relation in the diagram below: promise r p r om is ee
th e 
pr omise
 
The broken lines on the edge of the box with ‘the promise’ written inside 
indicate that there exists a dependence relation between the promise and the 
two boxes on its left and right. The picture should be read: the promise 
depends for its existence on the promiser (and not vice versa) and on the 
existence of the promisee (and not vice versa). The promise is said to be one-
sidely dependent on both the promiser and the promisee, since without these 
the promise could not exist, whereas the converse is not the case [6]. The 
promiser and promisee as persons do not require the existence of the promise 
in order to exist.  
Having said this, there are certain things that must be present, call them 
founding relations, in order for there to be a successful issuance of a promise: 
 
1.  The act of speaking (on the part of promiser) 
2.  Promiser must intend to perform the action F  
3.  The act of registering (on the part of promisee) 
4.  Promisee must desire that the promiser perform F. 
 
On the one side, the promiser must 1) utter something to the effect of ‘I 
promise to do F’ and 2) actually mean what he says, that is, actually intend to 
do F. The first condition states that a promise is an act that can be publicly 
apprehended. This is important for no other reason than that the promisee has 
the right to decline or accept a promise, as the case may be, and if the act were 
not made public, the promisee would be denied this right. Simply put: 
intending to do F is not the same thing as promising to do F. The second 
condition states that just uttering the words ‘I promise to do F’ is not enough. 
If one does not actually mean what one says, it is a sham promise or a lie. On 
the other side, the promisee must 3) recognize the utterance as a promise—
Austin referred to this as uptake—and 4) desire that the promiser do F 
(otherwise it is not a promise but a threat). There are many ways that a 
promise can be made. In each case, there must be a rule to the effect that uttering ‘I promise to do F’ in the appropriate context counts as a promise. 
Context here is important, since uttering these words in jest or to a non-
English speaker would not count as making a promise.  
In addition to these conditions there are some additional background 
conditions. In some cases the promiser must have the authority to promise to 
do F and, likewise, the promisee must have the authority to accept or decline 
F. For instance, only some healthcare personnel have the authority to promise 
a patient a certain medical procedure and only under certain circumstances 
does the guardian of a patient have the authority to grant permission for a 
medical procedure or treatment. Another condition is that there should exist 
no previous commitments on the part of the promiser or the promisee that 
would vitiate the promise. For example, a previous obligation to perform a 
medical procedure can vitiate a subsequent promise to perform some other 
medical service at that time. And finally, there must be a general background 
of trust for the promise to hold. Without this the entire social practice of 
making promises would not work.  
If all these conditions are meet, then the promise gives rise to a 
corresponding obligation (on the part of the promiser) and claim (on the part 
of the promisee). Call these the successor states of a promise. The diagram 
below represents those elements involved in a promise.  
promiser promisee
act of 
speaking
act of 
registering
content F
oblig-
ation claim
action: do F
 
As before the broken lines on the edge of a box represent the existence of a 
dependence relation. If there is a line drawn from a solid edge of a box to a 
broke edge of a box (e.g., between the promiser box and the obligation box), it 
indicates a one-sided dependence. If on the other hand there are two lines 
drawn from a box with a broken edge to another box with a broken edge (e.g., 
between the obligation and claim boxes), it indicates that there exists a mutual 
dependence [6]. Two objects are mutually dependent on one another if neither 
one can exist without the other. The promise itself is composed of a three-part 
structure: the act of speaking, the act of registering, and the content of the 
promise F. The promiser and promisee as well as the obligation and claim are not part of the promise. A promise is an event in time that exists only so long 
as it takes for the promiser to utter the statement and the promisee to register 
it. The obligation and claim, which are states and not events, exist from the 
time of the successful issuance of the promise until the content of the promise 
F is fulfilled. Promises, it should be noted, do not cause this fulfillment. 
Rather, the relation involved is something weaker than causation. We can talk 
here in terms of a tendency to be realized. Just as genes have a tendency to be 
expressed in the form of proteins and bodies have a tendency to fall when 
dropped, so promises have a tendency to be fulfilled—and in all such cases 
the tendencies in question can be blocked.  
4 Some Ontological Distinctions  
One of the principal goals of this paper is to see how speech acts, their 
successor states and documents are, ontologically speaking, tied up with one 
another. In order to fully appreciate this it will be important to make a few 
ontological distinctions.  
4.1 Substances and Processes 
We begin with the ontological distinction between substances and processes 
(a distinction that corresponds roughly to the RIM’s Act class and Entity 
class) [7]. Substances are entities which continue to exist through time: they 
preserve their identity from one moment to the next, even while undergoing a 
variety of different sorts of changes. The principal mark of a substance is that, 
if it exists at a time, then so also do all of its parts. Typical examples from the 
healthcare domain include the healthcare organization itself, the physicians, 
administrators, the patients and their family members, medical supplies and 
records, drugs, etc. A healthcare organization, for instance, continues to exist 
through time even as it undergoes changes in personnel or structural changes 
such as the reorganization of departments. Even though a healthcare 
organization may change over time, at any given time at which the 
organization exists at all it exists in toto. Processes (also called events, 
activities, occurrents) are in contrast never such as to exist in full in a single 
instant of time; rather, they are such as to unfold themselves in their 
successive phases, in the way in which, for example, the performance of a 
medical procedure unfolds itself through time. Processes characteristically 
have a beginning, a middle, and an end. Typical examples within the context 
of a healthcare organization include but are not limited to the diagnosis of a 
patient, the treatment of a disease, the circulation of blood and speech acts.  
4.2 Abstract Entities 
Within the context of a healthcare organization there are documents that 
record, for example, the existence of an insurance claim, a request for a medical test, an obligation to perform a surgical procedure and so on. The 
associated claims, requests, and obligations coincide with no part of physical 
reality but serve to hold the organization together as a social object. Abstract 
entities such as these are brought into existence by the appropriate 
corresponding speech acts. They are truly such that, as the HL7 RIM might 
put it, ‘there is no distinction between the entity and its documentation’. For 
other sorts of entities, however, this is not the case. Some social entities such 
as doctors and clinical wards coincide with physical objects or events and 
provide the scaffolding which supports those abstract entities that bind 
together an organization – entities which are not real, but which are yet tied to 
contexts of human behavior.  
4.3 Speech Acts and Documents 
A speech act—whether it is in the form of an utterance or physical marks on 
paper—in every case coincides with physical reality. But not all entities 
coincide with physical reality; once the promise is successful there arises the 
corresponding obligation and claim (the successor states). At this point there 
exist no portion of physical reality with which the successor states can be said 
to coincide. The question is in virtue of what do these entities exist? The 
answer is records or documents. In informal contexts, the memories of the 
participants is often enough, but in formal, legal contexts the records must be 
publicly verifiable as is the case with documents, whether they be paper based 
or electronic.  
4 An Assessment of the Act Center View of Healthcare 
The fundamental difference between the HL7’s act-centered view of 
healthcare and the one defended here is as follows: Where we distinguish 
between the speech act (an event), the successor states (which endure through 
time), and the document (a physical entity) that records the existence of the 
state into a single class, the RIM collapses these ontological distinctions into 
the single class, the Act class. In order to make the difference clearer consider 
the act of making a contract.  
According to the RIM a contract is an act and is defined as follows: an 
agreement of obligation between two or more parties that is subject to 
contractual law and enforcement. The intent mood of a contract would involve 
an intention or plan to draw up a contract and specifies the participants 
involved. The event mood would represent the actual act of drawing up the 
contract and the coming to agreement.  
The problem with this account is not its definition of a contract. Instead, 
the problem is with the framework in which this definition is placed. It is not 
uncommon for contracts to be modified or even nullified. The modification of 
a contract is a distinct act from the initial act that brought the contract into 
existence, and subsequent modifications would be distinct from both. How are we to understand the relations between these acts from the perspective of the 
RIM? No reference can be made to an entity that endures through time and 
undergoes changes, since the contract in question is not an entity but an act. 
One possible answer is to argue that the act of coming to agreement and the 
latter modifications are all linked together via relationships specified as an 
ActRelationship in the RIM. The problem with this answer is that there is no 
basis for linking these acts together, since they are all distinct acts, unless 
there is some underlying entity that unites one act to the next.  
This is exactly what we argue. A contract is a document that records the 
existence of an obligation that is the result of two or more parties agreeing to 
place themselves under that obligation. The speech act is an event that exists 
for a certain amount of time and gives rise to a successor state. The successor 
state may endure so long as all the parties involve continue to endure or until 
such time as another act is performed which modifies or nullifies the previous 
agreement.  
Similar difficulties face the classification of such items as clinical 
document, insurance policies, financial accounts, consent forms and diet as 
members of the Act-class. 
5 Conclusion 
There exists, then, a definite need to pay closer attention to the ways that 
humans in healthcare organizations interact, pick-up and share information 
and knowledge. Attempts to develop standards for interoperability between 
healthcare information services will be aided by an ontology of social 
interaction that is maximally representative of organizational reality. Attempts 
such as the HL7 to develop socio-technical environments will be greatly 
improved if more effort is brought to bear onto the ontological nature of 
healthcare organizations. The neglect of objective states of affairs and real 
processes, the failure to distinguish properly between acts and documents and 
more generally the neglect of the context within which messages are conveyed 
places obstacles in the way of an adequate ontology of healthcare 
organizations of the sort which is needed for effective knowledge 
management. This paper has been but a small contribution to the larger project 
of developing a sound ontology of organizations.  
Acknowledgements  
This work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation under 
the auspices of its Wolfgang Paul Program.  
References 
[1]  Stefanelli M. The socio-organizational age of artificial intelligence in 
medicine. Artificial Intelligence in Medicine 41 (2002) 
[2]  Health Level 7 Reference Information Model 2.01. www.hl7.org. [3]  Rector AL, Nolan WA, Kay S: Foundations for an electronic medical 
record. Methods Inf Med, 30 (1991): 179-86. 
[4]  Austin JL.  How to do Things with Words. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1962. 
[5]  Searle, JR. Speech Acts.  An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. 
[6]  Smith B. The Basic Tools of Formal Ontology. In: Gaurino N. ed. 
Formal Ontology in Information Systems. Amsterdam, Oxford, Tokyo, 
Washington, DC: IOS Press (Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and 
Applications), 1998, 19-28. 
[7]  Smith, Barry, Pierre Grenon: The Cornucopia of Formal-Ontological 
Relations. Forthcoming in: Dialectica. 
 
 